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1.    Introduction 
 
Dealing with climate change caused by dangerous levels of man-made 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is seen as one of the most pressing global 
problems currently faced. Climate scientists tell us that, in order to have a 50 per 
cent chance of limiting the rise in global temperature to just 2 degrees (relative 
to 1850-1900) from 1990 levels, there needs to be a global 40-70% per cent cut 
in carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions2 levels by 2050 relative to 2010 
(see for example Allen et al., 2009 and IPCC, 2014).3 This has been translated 
into an approximately 80% target reduction in CO2e for advanced countries 
relative to 1990.4 If CO2e emissions do not decrease there is a heightened risk of 
dangerously high global temperatures that will have difficult-to-predict impacts 
on the stability of the global environment.  
On the face of it this looks like a very challenging situation that requires 
action on a scale that we have not seen so far. That seems increasingly unlikely to 
happen in the time frame identified. The Kyoto Protocol of 1997 led to initial 
agreement on action to reduce GHGs at the global level, but was only ratified by 
83 countries (out of over 190), and only included quantified emissions limitation 
or reduction objectives for a much smaller group of industrialized countries (so 
called Annex 1 countries). Countries that have ratified the Protocol account for 
approximately 63% of emissions from these advanced economies.5 But more 
than a decade since the Kyoto Protocol entered into force, annual GHG emissions 
have not yet started to decline, and the prospects for a ‘Global Deal’ (Stern, 2008) 
on emissions reduction seem remote. 
                                                        
 
1 The author wishes to thank Michael Mehling and various seminar audiences for their comments 
and encouragement. He acknowledges the financial support of the MIT Center for Energy and 
Environmental Policy Research. The usual disclaimer applies. 
2  For simplicity, CO2e will be used interchangeably with ‘carbon’ throughout the rest of this 
paper. 
3 Global GHG emissions in 1990 were 38 Gigatonnes of CO2e, in 2010 they were 49 Gigatonnes of 
CO2e (IPCC, 2014, p. 22). A 70% cut relative to 2010, is a 60% cut relative to 1990. 
4 See for example: https://www.theccc.org.uk/2014/11/25/the-ipcc-report-and-the-uk-2050-
target (accessed 24 November 2015). 
5 See: 
http://unfccc.int/files/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/application/pdf/kp_ratification.pdf 
(accessed 24 November 2015). 
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Against that backdrop, this paper explores the prospects for a global 
carbon market as the centrepiece of any serious attempt to reach the ambitious 
goal for GHG reductions set by climate scientists. My aim is to clarify the extent 
to which we know what policy might best support global decarbonisation.  
My starting point is that the policy solution to excessive emissions of 
GHGs is actually well established in theory as well as in very large-scale 
experiments, specifically the European Union’s Emissions Trading System (EU 
ETS). These give some confidence that carbon emissions reduction policy based 
around restricting the quantity of emissions permits to the level suggested by 
climate scientists would be the most sensible approach to delivering the depths 
of emissions reductions that is required.6  
Indeed, we should stop giving the impression that we do not know what 
policy to put in place to deal with global GHG emissions. Climate science may be 
constantly evolving and contentious, but the economics of emissions control is 
not. An example of this was the recent suggestion that there needed to be a big 
increase in global publicly funded renewable energy research and development 
(RD+D) expenditure, from $6 billion to $15 billion per year for the next 10 years 
(under the ‘Global Apollo Programme’).7 This type of proposal suggests that 
dealing with decarbonisation is still primarily a research project. This is not the 
case. 
On the contrary: it is already the case that significant sums are being 
spent on renewable energy RD+D. In 2014 the world spent an estimated $11.7 
billion p.a. on renewable energy RD+D. Also, in the power sector, global RES 
investment is closing in on global fossil investment (UNEP/BNEF, 2015). In 2014 
global renewable power investment was around 90% of the fossil fuel power 
investment level. Within member countries of the Organisation of Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD), the picture is even more striking with 
perhaps less than 75% of power generation investment being spent on zero 
carbon technologies over the period 2007-2013 (World Economic Forum and 
Bain Consulting, 2015). A transition in the research base and in investment is 
underway at least in electric power – these suggest that the technological 
barriers to decarbonisation are being overcome. 
Instead my contention is that the way forward is that we should (simply!) 
implement a reasonably comprehensive set of quantity restrictions on CO2e, 
building on experience with existing policies such as the EU ETS. 
The paper proceeds as follows. First, I discuss what I mean by a global 
carbon market and its theoretical properties. Next, I discuss the EU ETS 
experience and the recent experience with the Australian carbon tax. I then go on 
to assess the evolving carbon market initiatives in the US and in China. In my 
                                                        
 
6 Indeed one could go further and suggest that any other conceivable policy (or set of policies) 
seems to have no realistic prospect of adding up to a policy strong enough to reach the required 
cuts in GHG emissions. 
7 King et al. (undated). 
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conclusions, I apply some principles of ‘good’ energy policy making to the 
prospects for a successful global carbon market. 
 
2.    What Do We Mean by a Global Carbon Market? 
 
2.1    Why Price Carbon? 
 
At the heart of a carbon market is the idea that putting a single price on CO2e 
emissions regardless of their source is a good idea. Carbon pricing through a 
market has most value in the early stages of decarbonisation. The market can 
help with identifying the mix of sectors to decarbonise; the mix of existing low 
carbon technologies per sector; the role of demand side reduction and 
substitution; and with guiding consumer and climate NGO pressure. A single 
price of carbon is fundamentally about identification of low cost decarbonisation 
options within a general equilibrium (i.e. multiple interconnected markets) 
setting. This sort of idea is in sharp contrast to a technology-based approach, 
which assumes both the efficacy of the technology and the extent to which it 
should be implemented. It is because at the whole economy level we are unlikely 
to know how best to approach decarbonisation that carbon pricing, rather than a 
technology driven approach, is so valuable. Putting a price on pollution is a 
policy that has wide support among environmental economists because it 
directly tackles the environmental externality involved in pollution and because 
it has a good track record, especially when contrasted with conventional 
command and control approaches based on the mandating of particular 
technological solutions. 
Carbon markets (cap and trade schemes) and carbon taxes are the two 
standard ways of putting a price on carbon emissions. The major difference 
between these two approaches is that carbon markets set the quantity of carbon 
to be emitted and let the price vary in the market for emissions permits, while 
carbon taxes fix the price but let the quantity of emissions vary. As such, carbon 
markets introduce a price risk for those exposed to the spot price of permits, 
while carbon taxes introduce quantity risks on the climate. As we shall see, 
carbon markets are the more popular form of carbon pricing globally. 
Many societal stakeholders do not like carbon markets precisely because 
they deal so effectively with the general equilibrium issues and ensure that the 
overall quantity of permits is fixed no matter what the demand conditions are in 
permit markets.  
Properties of carbon markets that allow them to achieve general 
equilibrium are their transparency and their ability to highlight the following: 
differences between included and non-included parties; the incidence of final 
costs and prices, especially to consumers; the financial flows within and between 
countries; the cost impact of political interventions; and the lowest cost 
interventions, which effectively acts to restrain special interests. Thus if 
governments choose to enact limited carbon trading schemes, it will soon 
become clear what effect they are having and on whom. It is also clear when the 
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initial quantities of permits available in the market are too few or too many by 
the evolution of prices. In addition, any announcement on the extension of 
current trading scheme will have a verdict given on its tightness by the price 
reaction in the permit market. 
Basically, political opposition to the use of carbon markets is based on the 
fact that they do work in a predictable way. 
 
2.2     What Are the Characteristics of a Global Market? 
 
What would a global carbon market look like? This is an interesting conceptual 
question. One might imagine that it would involve a single type of emissions 
permit issued by a global authority and a single global monitoring and 
enforcement authority. The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) does issue Certified Emissions Reductions (CERs), which 
approximately have this property and in some sense already provide a global 
carbon price at the moment. 
However, in general, global markets do not have this type of framework. 
Global markets are actually made up of voluntarily interconnected markets, 
which produce and trade broadly similar products with price arbitrage between 
them. The individual markets within the interconnected system have their own 
systems of property right definition and enforcement. A good example of this is 
the global market for oil. While one can clearly speak about the global price of oil 
and global supply and demand conditions, actually the global market is made up 
of a number of interconnected markets (such as West Texas Intermediate (WTI) 
and Brent Crude). These markets give rise to their own prices (WTI is usually 
cheaper than Brent, due to the quality difference). The situation in global natural 
gas is even less integrated, with major regional markets (in the US, Europe and 
the Pacific Basin), but prices do to some extent move together. 
 
For us to talk about a global market, all that needs to be true is that markets are 
interconnected enough for major price differences between significant regions to 
be arbitraged. This clearly does happen in oil and is happening to a greater 
extent in natural gas. A single trading platform or integrated regional platforms 
(as for oil, or foreign currency) are not required, though clearly end-users can 
arbitrage between markets for both oil and gas because the underlying 
commodity can be used in any location. The parallel for a global market in 
carbon emissions permits is simply that individual markets recognise a permit 
from another market as being exercisable in their market. 
The idea of a global market does not require all sectors of the economy to 
be exposed to global price fluctuations. Whole sectors can be exempted from 
such exposure, either by contractual hedging with longer-term private contracts 
or by government intervention.  Thus even in market based energy systems, 
energy companies can sign long term contracts for the supply of gas or coal 
which effectively reduces the exposure of their customers to spot market 
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fluctuations in international commodity prices. This happens with carbon when 
the government buys renewables or nuclear power with multi-year fixed prices 
above the expected average long-term market price. It also happens when 
governments fix final (i.e. administered) prices of energy regardless of the 
fluctuating fossil fuel price, such as in the many oil producing countries who 
choose to sell oil to their domestic consumers at much less than the world 
market price equivalent price. By contrast developed countries with very high 
taxes on oil products, such as gasoline, also reduce the exposure of their 
domestic customers to global oil price fluctuations. Doing this dulls the exposure 
of the domestic economy by reducing the demand below what it might otherwise 
have been. 
Once a global market emerges for any commodity we might expect the 
degree of exposure to prices based on the global market price to increase over 
time. This occurs because the costs of non-alignment are likely to grow over 
time, especially for countries with abnormally low prices. These countries are 
over-consuming the commodity with the loss of export revenue (if they produce 
it domestically) or an increasing import bill. Thus one might expect that internal 
prices might converge over time, though this process may be very slow. 8  
This process of convergence might also apply to global carbon pricing, 
with initially very different approaches to the determination of national carbon 
prices giving way over time to more market integration and price convergence. 
This would imply that even if countries started off with initially purely 
domestically determined carbon pricing (via, say, a carbon tax), there would be 
pressure to align domestic carbon prices with those emerging from large 
international carbon markets. Indeed, Stiglitz (2015) has recently made the case 
for a hybrid approach with some countries opting for cap and trade, and others 
going for carbon taxes, each as they see fit, as part of a global solution to GHG 
emissions. 
 
2.3    A Global Carbon Market? 
 
The global oil market provides a good backdrop to thinking about a global 
carbon market. The basic parameters of a global carbon market are the 
following. 
In 2012 the amount of CO2e emissions was 48,000m tonnes (WRI, 2015) 
(of which around 2/3 is CO2). Assume the long run price of CO2e needs to be $100 
per tonne CO2e by 2050 to be consistent with the emissions reduction target 
needed. This would suggest that the market might be worth $4800  billion per 
year. However this would overstate the value of the likely carbon market at any 
point in time. A plausible long run equilibrium might therefore be 10,000 m 
                                                        
 
8 Indeed the IEA (2015, pp. 96-99) does discuss some evidence that global fossil fuel subsidies 
are beginning to decline, after adjusting for oil price effects. 
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tonnes at $80 per tonne.9 If 10% of the value of this market were traded between 
regional markets (say US, China, EU etc), this would require global flows of funds 
equal to $80  billion per annum. How large is this market? For comparison, the 
global oil market is roughly 85 million barrels per day (BP, 2015). At $100 per 
barrel (which might be a long run price) this adds up to $3102  billion per year. 
Meanwhile looking at the potential financial flows between regional carbon 
markets, $80 billion is less than the current global international aid budget 
(which is $135 billion per annum).10 
These numbers suggest that if all GHGs were part of a global carbon 
market, then this would be a large market but not out of all proportion to the 
sorts of markets that already exist at the global level. 
 
2.4     Creating the Global Carbon Market – Is it Possible? 
 
There are around 190 states in the world. It would seem that reaching a global 
agreement on allocating the quantity of GHG emissions to each state would be 
very difficult, but global emissions are highly skewed as Table 1 shows. The top 
10 emitters alone, including the European Union, cover 68% of emissions. 
 
Table 1: Top Ten Emitters of GHGs Globally  
(incl. Land use change and forestry (LUCF)) 2012  
 
China 22.4% 
United States 12.2% 
European Union 8.7% 
India 6.1% 
Russian Federation 4.7% 
Indonesia 4.2% 
Brazil 3.8% 
Japan 2.5% 
Canada 1.8% 
Mexico 1.6% 
Total 68% 
Source: World Resources Institute CAIT database. 
 
Looking at the G2011 + Spain (the group of leading countries who regularly meet 
to discuss international affairs), this covers 85% of world GDP and 75% of world 
CO2e (incl. land use change and forestry). If we include the next 10 largest 
emitting countries, we get to 85% of world CO2e. A reasonably sized initial large 
                                                        
 
9 See IPCC (2014, p. 21), in the years out to 2070-2080. 
10 See http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/development-aid-stable-in-2014-but-flows-to-poorest-
countries-still-falling.htm (accessed 24 November 2015). 
11 The G20 consists of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, 
Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union. Spain is a permanent invitee. 
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carbon market, with border tax adjustment (Neuhoff and Ismer, 2007)12 would 
be sufficient to incentivize emergence of an increasingly global carbon market 
drawing in all the largest countries. How difficult would it be to get 31 countries 
to agree to quantitative emissions reduction targets? 
The EU ETS has 31 countries participating at the moment (28 EU member 
states plus Iceland, Norway and Liechtenstein). Of the G21, 6 (including the EU 
itself) are in the EU ETS. Of the 34 OECD countries, 21 are in the EU ETS. Of the 
rest of the world, many are in the spheres of influence of the largest 31 emitting 
countries. This suggests that agreeing a reasonably comprehensive agreement of 
quantity controls for GHGs is not primarily a problem of the complexity of the 
negotiations that might be involved. The EU is clearly not a representative 
sample of countries in the world, but what it does exhibit very well is the power 
of shared interest on a number of issues to enforce agreement on a particular 
issue, where the majority of countries harbors a strong political position. 
 
2.5     Carbon Trading vs. Carbon Taxes? 
 
An important theoretical discussion in environmental economics relates to the 
relative efficacy of emissions trading vs emissions taxes. Should the world 
attempt to co-ordinate on quantity targets for GHG emissions or a set of 
reasonably consistent carbon prices (taxes)? Weitzman (1974) makes a strong 
case for pollution taxes, which can be illustrated by the diagram in Figure 1. He 
argues that if the slope of the marginal cost of abatement curve (MC) is steeper 
than the slope of the marginal benefit of abatement curve (MB), then it is better 
to set a tax than to set quantity limits if there is uncertainty about the exact 
position of the MC curve. This is because the cost of mistakes in the estimation of 
the position of the MC curve (cost of abatement uncertainty) is lower if we get 
the tax level wrong than if we get the quantity level wrong, something that is 
illustrated by the size of the deadweight loss from the mistakes in the following 
diagram: 
 
  
                                                        
 
12 Border tax adjustments could impose carbon tax adjustments on imports from countries that 
choose to remain outside the large carbon trading area. 
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Figure 1: Carbon Taxes or Carbon Markets? Weitzman Argument:  
Costs of Errors Setting Quantities 
 
 
 
 
 
It may be questioned, however, whether this sort of argument applies well to 
GHGs. 
The Weitzman result depends on the relative slopes of two curves, and his 
analysis suggests that the extreme cases where the relative cost of setting taxes 
is higher is more ‘likely’ than the extreme cases where the cost of setting 
quantities is higher. Since we do not really know where the MB curve is, and 
since it might involve big discontinuities in environmental damage (and hence be 
very steep in places), that is an argument in favour of quantity setting. In reality, 
a lot of uncertainty exists about the marginal benefit curve (i.e. we do not know 
where the climate damage effects exactly kick in, or how societies will adjust if 
they do). This is indicated by the wildly differing estimates on the value of the 
social cost of carbon (Hope and Newbery, 2008). 
It is worth pointing out that if there is no uncertainty in the MC curve, but 
only in the MB curve, then the cost of mistakes is the same under both quantity 
or price setting. Thus if the marginal cost of abatement is actually relatively well 
defined or lower than predicted, then it is unlikely that the mistake in quantity is 
worse than the mistake in price. 
In practice there is no suggestion that we would ever seek to impose a 
single price or quantity limit for all time, as the model is set up to analyse; 
instead, we would look to tighten the pollution control regime over time. This 
significantly reduces the cost of mistakes, allowing the incorporation of learning 
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on the position of curves in the light of further information on the position of the 
MB and, especially, the MC curve. Thus a better representation of the situation is 
perhaps Figure 2, where identifying the optimal price (in the region of the blue 
ball) is very different, given the uncertainty in both the MC and MB curves. 
 
 
Figure 2: A Better Argument?  
Prices Harder to Identify than Dangerous Quantity 
 
 
Source: Grubb and Newbery (2008, p. 282) 
 
Weitzman’s arguments are based on the relative deadweight losses arising from 
price setting vs. quantity setting. Weitzman (2015) has recently made three 
additional arguments in favour of a global carbon tax over a global quantity cap. 
These are: that revenues are nationally collected with a tax; that negotiating one 
price is easier than negotiating n quantities; and that governments have an 
incentive to coordinate upwards on the tax, rather than try and reduce the price 
under a quantity cap by seeking higher quantities. It is worth addressing each of 
these in turn. First, revenues from auctioning permits under carbon trading can 
be (and indeed are in the EU ETS) collected nationally, so this is not in reality a 
difference. Except that under central allocation of permits, one can (additionally) 
use the national quantity allocation to transfer wealth to countries bearing 
heavier costs of adjustment, in a way that might be easier than under the direct 
transfer of tax receipts. Second, the complexity of negotiation point is an 
interesting one. This is superficially attractive, but in international tax 
coordination, one suspects the devil is in the detail of implementation in each 
country and the fact that the nominal tax rate (in US dollars?) is the same is not 
really the issue – it could equally well be different without any loss of difficulty of 
implementation. Finally, on the fact that self-enforcement on a higher tax rate is 
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likely, I am not sure there is any evidence that countries do coordinate upwards 
in negotiations on taxes. The EU carbon tax experience was that countries could 
not even agree to introduce the tax, let alone coordinate it upwards.  
Cramton et al. (2015) make a further important conceptual point in 
favour of a uniform global carbon tax. Namely, that it introduces less volatility 
into the pricing of carbon and hence into the flow of funds that must necessarily 
flow between nations to achieve ambitious climate goals. Of course, this is an 
important argument. However it is easy to overstate the extent to which carbon 
prices within a cap and trade system are volatile, relative to the non-volatility of 
carbon taxes. Yes, prices in carbon markets are volatile in the same way as other 
commodities, such as oil and gas. However this is a volatility that can be 
managed and indeed is managed by long-term contracts, with the exposure to 
short run carbon prices ultimately being quite limited. Carbon taxes may not 
exhibit daily or monthly variability, but they can be reduced, increased or even 
removed by future government action (c.f. the Australian carbon tax discussed 
below). What is more, carbon taxes can introduce volatility into the outturn 
quantity of GHGs released, with consequences for climate risk. 
There are some other types of arguments that are very important in 
favour of carbon trading. 
First, there is the importance of consistency between the 
recommendations from climate science and the economic instruments employed 
to act on that science. Climate science can and does frame the climate problem as 
being about the absolute quantity of GHGs emitted (e.g. Max = c. 1000 Gigatonnes 
(Gt) of Carbon = c. 2440 Gt CO2e) if the rise of significant warming is to be 
contained (e.g. Allen et al., 2009). Clearly, emissions trading based on quantity 
limitation coordinates the economic framing and the scientific framing in a way 
that setting a target price for carbon emissions does not. 
Second, there are important legal precedents that an international 
agreement on emissions reduction must work within. As we have seen with the 
global oil market, global markets can and do exist based on internationally 
respected property rights. The idea that commodities and ownership rights can 
be traded internationally is well established in international law. This can 
happen while respecting national sovereignty. Thus tradable quantities of 
emission permits with initial allocations of pollution rights is consistent with the 
current basis of property rights and trade (as the EU ETS and other international 
agreements to respect nationally created property rights demonstrate). By 
contrast, co-ordination of taxes across borders is not something that is 
consistent with national sovereignty, and there are no examples globally of co-
ordination upwards13 of environmental or any other tax rates. 
                                                        
 
13 There are some good examples of global coordination on the reduction or elimination of tax 
rates (e.g. as part of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) free trade rounds). 
However coordinating on tax increases is quite a different story. The closest example is perhaps 
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Third, there is a rather important point to do with the rebound effects of a 
carbon tax. It is common to argue that carbon taxes produce a double dividend, 
in that higher carbon (and indeed any environmental taxation) leads to reduced 
taxes elsewhere and hence may stimulate the economy by reducing the 
inefficiencies associated with conventional taxes which are leveled on earned 
income and are therefore distortionary of work – leisure choices. 14  If 
environmental tax revenue is then used to target benefits on lower income 
consumers (as was the intention in Australia) this may also stimulate the 
economy via the multiplier effect arising from their re-distributional effects. Both 
of these types of effects mean that environmental taxes may raise demand for 
goods and services and hence produce some offsetting rise in CO2e emissions. 
Thus carbon taxes may not produce as big a reduction in aggregate emissions as 
expected. This is not a problem with quantity restrictions on carbon emissions, 
where there is no possibility of a rebound effect being at work in aggregate. 
Fourth, a key advantage of carbon trading is that the price of carbon 
dioxide permits is pro-cyclical. This is a good way of protecting the mechanism at 
times when the economy is doing poorly. There are good reasons why this makes 
sense from a social cost benefit analysis point of view, namely that social 
discount rates rise in times of recession: this is because inequality aversion goes 
up and hence social discount rates rise. Fixed tax rates become more 
burdensome and hence difficult to defend in times of recession, and more 
vulnerable to being reduced in a way that undermines the long-term credibility 
of the carbon tax mechanism. 
Finally, Gollier and Tirole (2015) make an interesting set of arguments in 
favour of cap and trade based on the relative ease of enforcing a global carbon 
tax vs global quantity restrictions. Their point is that actually enforcing a global 
carbon tax would be very difficult to monitor. This is because it would be easy to 
turn a blind eye to enforcement of payments from particular polluters where this 
produced a national benefit. In addition, other taxes could easily be adjusted to 
mitigate the impacts of the carbon tax, in particular other taxes on fuel. This 
would undermine the overall impact of carbon taxes. 
 
2.6    The Evidence on Carbon Emissions Trading vs. Carbon Taxes 
 
The European Union spent five years in the early 1990s discussing a carbon tax 
at the EU level.15 It could not agree on a carbon tax, but it did subsequently agree 
on introducing an emissions trading system. Other international or multi-
jurisdictional systems for carbon pricing have all made use of carbon trading, 
                                                                                                                                                              
 
the EU’s effort to co-ordinate Value-added Tax (VAT) rates within the EU, but this is not about 
equalizing the VAT rates, and rather about keeping them within bands. 
14 For a discussion see Smith (1998). 
15 The carbon tax was proposed in 1992 and finally withdrawn in 1997. The proposed level of 
the tax was initially $3 per barrel of oil (which is approximately $7 per tonne CO2) rising at $1 
per year to $10 (European Commission, 1992). 
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notably California and Quebec under the Western Climate Initiative (WCI) and 
nine states in the U.S. Northeast and Mid-Atlantic under the Regional Greenhouse 
Gas Initiative (RGGI). Even within countries, carbon taxation has proved very 
difficult to enact. 
This is not only about the sovereignty of governments with respect to 
taxation, which they expect to be able to adjust annually within the budget. It is 
also about the fact that tax rates are subject to periodic review, making any 
initial scheme vulnerable to subsequent political interference. In particular, it 
may be difficult to raise taxes from their initial levels in order to strengthen the 
price signal. Differences in the political cycle mean that it would be difficult to 
coordinate increases to tax rates across countries, at least more difficult than 
coordinating agreements to tighten the quantities within an emissions cap.16 
Energy taxation on different fuels shows wide variance within and 
between countries. This suggests the political difficulty of coordinating on taxes, 
given very different attitudes to energy taxation in general. This is perhaps 
because vested interests in many jurisdictions find it easy to keep taxes at a low 
level or have been able to secure substantial exemptions, due to the lack of 
transparency around the domestic tax setting process. 
Table 2 shows the relative size of the biggest actual and planned carbon 
trading schemes in 2014. The coverage for all carbon trading schemes is about 
9% of global GHGs, which together with carbon taxes, brings about 12% of GHGs 
under some form of carbon pricing. 
 
Table 2: Emissions Trading Schemes 
 
EU ETS 2084 Mt p.a. (2013) 
China pilot schemes 1115 Mt p.a. (2013-14) 
Australia (initially a tax) 283 Mt p.a. (2012-13) 
California-Quebec  184 Mt p.a. (2013) 
RGGI – Eastern United States 165 Mt p.a. (2013) 
Kazakhstan 147 Mt p.a. (2013) 
New Zealand 31 Mt p.a. (2011) 
Switzerland 3 Mt p.a. (2013) 
UNFCCC – CDMs 350 Mt p.a. (3013) 
Total c. 9% of global emissions 
Source: World Bank (2014). 
 
The prices and the coverage of the current schemes remains low (World Bank, 
2014, p.52). Prices are often very low and a long way short of the $80 that might 
be necessary to actually help achieve the emissions reductions required. In the 
EU ETS, for instance, the price is currently (November 2015) only around $9.50 
(8.40 Euros) per tonne of CO2; in California-Quebec it is $12.90 per tonne of 
                                                        
 
16 The EU has recently agreed to tighten its carbon cap out to 2030. 
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CO2e; and in RGGI it is $6.02 per tonne of CO2. The global value of carbon pricing 
is thus around $50 billion p.a. – a long way short of the $800 billion envisioned 
above. Some carbon taxes are very high (e.g. the Swedish carbon tax is $130 per 
tonne of CO2), but these high prices are rare. Emissions coverage within pricing 
systems ranges from 20-85% of GHG emissions, and typically amounts to around 
40-50% (the EU ETS covers 45% of EU emissions). Normally this will include the 
power sector and energy intensive industry (such as steel and cement). 
By contrast governments are much keener to subsidise renewables (via 
Feed-in-tariffs and Renewable Certificate Schemes) and fossil fuels by selling 
them below economic cost. In 2014 renewable subsidies were $135 billion 
globally, while fossil fuel subsidies were $493 billion (IEA, 2015). At the moment 
governments are clearly willing to spend large amounts of money subsidising 
energy production and use, but much less on pollution control. 
However the World Bank (2015, p. 11-12) has documented the progress 
with carbon pricing, and in particular emissions trading. As of 2017, 38 countries 
(and 23 sub-national territories) will have some form of carbon pricing. This has 
increased from 2 countries in 1990. 
 
3. Lessons from the EU ETS and the Australian Carbon Tax 
 
3.1    The EU Emissions Trading System 
 
The EU ETS began in January 2005 and has now been extended to 2030. It is still 
the biggest emissions trading scheme in the world, covering 11,000 individual 
stationary sources of emissions in the power and industrial sectors, as well as 
aviation within the EU. The EU ETS has had a chequered history as the evolution 
of prices within the mechanism shows (see Figure 3). Prices have been as high as 
30 Euros per tonne of CO2, but are now less than 10 Euros. This is partly a result 
of the way an emissions trading system works to minimise the cost of complying 
with a given quantity cap within the scheme. Lower than expected prices are a 
sign of success in achieving a given quantity target. 
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Figure 3: EU ETS – Price History 
 
 
 
Source: European Environment Agency, see http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-
maps/figures/eua-future-prices-200520132011/eua-future-prices-200520132011-eps-
file/image_original (accessed 24 November 2015). 
 
 
The initial collapse of prices in 2007 was due to over allocation of quantities in 
the initial trading period (which were not bankable to the second period from 
January 2008). This primarily happened because national governments were 
able to set their own quantity targets within the scheme. The second price 
collapse in 2009 followed the global financial crisis, which particularly effected 
EU GDP and demand growth. 
However the scheme has continued and has now been extended from 
2020 to 2030.17 The scheme has evolved and been strengthened to some extent. 
There is now an EU wide cap with allocation of auction shares to national 
governments, preventing the over allocation problem at the national level. Free 
allocation of permits to existing polluters, which comprised most of the permits 
in the early trading years, has now been replaced with residual free allocation to 
trade impacted sectors, with most sectors having to buy permits at auction. This 
reduces the problem in the power sector of double payment to polluters, who 
gained free allocation of valuable permits, plus the ability to increase electricity 
rates based on the rise in the marginal price of power due to the opportunity 
cost of extra permits at the marginal price setting plant.  
                                                        
 
17 For a discussion of progress with the EU ETS and future directions, see Meadows et al. (2015). 
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There is a move towards linking the EU ETS with other emissions trading 
systems, rather than allowing the introduction of large numbers of offset 
reductions from CER projects; the introduction of large numbers of CERs served 
to keep the price down in the initial years. However in spite of promising recent 
developments in the overall design of the scheme, there remains a substantial 
overhang of permits in the market, perhaps as much as one year’s emissions, 
banked for future use. This serves to keep the price low into the future. The EU 
has decided to introduce a market stability reserve (MSR) to take some of the 
permits out of the market and raise the price in the short run (and potentially 
reduce high prices in the future), but the MSR is small in relation to the size of 
the overhang of permits.18 
The most encouraging development spearheaded by the EU Commission 
(which is responsible for administering the scheme) is that, when setting the 
new 2030 energy and climate policy targets, carbon emission reduction is now 
the centre piece of the policy, rather than one of three potentially conflicting 
policy goals. Thus the 2030 target for decarbonisation is a 40% reduction in GHG 
emissions (relative to 1990), i.e. a further 25% emissions reduction relative to 
the 2020 target in 10 years, implying a 43% reduction of ETS covered sectors 
relative to 2005. This is in addition to an EU-wide renewable energy (RE) target 
of 27%, which is subject to weaker enforcement than the current 20% target for 
2020, and seems capable of being delivered by the necessary national efforts to 
achieve the decarbonisation target. 
Similarly, the energy efficiency target of a 27% reduction in energy use 
relative to business as usual (up from 20% in 2020) is also not subject to 
national enforcement and is capable of being delivered by the decarbonisation 
target. 
Ellerman et al. (2010) give an initial and broadly positive assessment of 
the EU ETS. They note that carbon has been priced, and while initial allocation 
was controversial, emissions did fall by 2-5% in the early years of the scheme. 
Moreover, the market for permits is liquid and efficient, and the negative effects 
on traded sectors has been small. The EU ETS remains an impressive multi-
country environmental policy instrument capable of further tightening if other 
jurisdictions agree to also restrict their emissions, reducing the problem of 
carbon leakage. Boasson and Wettestad (2012) label it a good example of what 
they call international institutional entrepreneurship, which clearly established 
the EU as the leading policy maker with respect to decarbonisation. 
 
3.2     The Australian Carbon Tax 
 
                                                        
 
18 See http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/ets/reform/index_en.htm (accessed 24 November 
2015). 
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If the EU ETS provides a broadly positive experience of the carbon pricing 
generally and carbon emissions trading in particular, the Australian experience 
with carbon pricing is rather different. 
The Australian Carbon Pricing Mechanism (CPM) was introduced as a 
carbon tax in July 2012 at AUD 23.00. It rose to AUD 24.15 (c. 16 Euros) per 
tonne of CO2e in 2013-14, with a view to transitioning to a cap-and-trade scheme 
in July 2015. The CPM covered 60% of Australian emissions. On the face of it, this 
was an impressive achievement, which opened up the possibility of linking 
Australia with the EU ETS and other cap-and-trade schemes. 
The problem was that the scheme was controversial from the outset. 
Unlike in Europe, where there has been a widespread consensus on the need to 
do something about the climate problem and cross-party political support for 
carbon emission reductions,19 this was not the case in Australia. The Clean 
Energy Act 2011 passed narrowly in the legislature.20 The then opposition 
Liberal party campaigned on a promise to abolish the CPM as one of their 
flagship policies. They won the election in 2013, and the tax was abolished in July 
2014. 
  Robson (2014) offers an interesting analysis of the failure of the 
Australian carbon tax, suggesting that other measures (such as subsidies to 
renewables) might have been more effective. In particular, his analysis shows 
that although the government did attempt to mitigate the impact of the tax on 
voters by substantially recycling the revenue, this was poorly targeted and most 
taxpayers were worse off as a result of the combination of higher energy prices 
and lower non-energy tax rates. Robson highlights calculations which show the 
effective marginal tax rate going down for 0.56 million lower income tax payers, 
but going up for 2.21 million middle income tax payers. Overall, the fiscal impact 
was large, with AUD 27.7 billion (c. $20 billion USD) of taxes being raised over 
four years, of which only AUD 15.3 billion was returned to households, with the 
government fiscal position actually worsening after taking into account the free 
allocation of permits and other measures undertaken. 
The failure of the Australian carbon tax highlights once again that taxes 
are clearly not superior to cap-and-trade as a way of reducing price volatility, 
given that the key to policy certainty is the political sustainability of any pricing 
scheme and the basic economics were not affected by the lack of daily volatility 
in carbon prices. As Robson points out, the initial price of carbon was actually 
quite high, especially relative to the wholesale price of electricity. Introducing 
the carbon tax produced a sharp spike in wholesale electricity prices (of around 
20%, at a time when prices were rising), which could have been avoided if the 
tax had been introduced at a lower level initially. 
                                                        
 
19 In the UK the Climate Change Act 2008 passed its final vote in the House of Commons 463-3. 
20 36-32 in the Senate, see 
http://www.rsc.org/chemistryworld/News/2011/November/14111101.asp 
(accessed 24 November 2015). 
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4.    Signs of Progress in the United States and China 
 
4.1    Progress Under the Clean Air Act in the United States 
 
The US already has a number of regional carbon trading schemes. Indeed, as of 
late 2015, no less than 10 US states are already participating in regional carbon 
trading. All of these schemes cover the power sector and have been the result of 
state-level initiatives. 
The US Congress failed to ratify the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 and hence has 
not signed up to emissions reductions targets as part of the UNFCCC process so 
far. The EU, by contrast, did ratify the Kyoto Protocol, and the EU ETS is a major 
part of its policy response. National carbon trading proposals have been 
presented in Congress, but so far have not progressed. These include, for 
instance, the Lieberman-McCain Bill in the Senate in 2003, and the Waxman-
Markey Bill in the House of Representatives in 2009.21 Both of these bills 
proposed a reasonably comprehensive carbon market, covering 85% of CO2e 
emissions, including the power sector, industry and transportation. 
However, another potential route to a federal carbon market is being 
pursued, with the support of President Obama, under existing legislation around 
the Clean Air Act, which is administered by the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA) (see Palmer, 2014). 
In 2007, the EPA established its authority to regulate GHGs under the 
Clean Air Act, when the Supreme Court ruled in its favour in a case between it 
and the US State of Massachusetts. In 2009, the EPA established that GHGs were 
an ‘Endangerment’ to public health and that GHGs did ‘Cause or Contribute’ to 
negative environmental impacts. These rulings established that the EPA was free 
to regulate GHGs at the national level. In 2010, the EPA reached a settlement 
between various state and environmental petitioners who were demanding that 
the EPA take action on GHGs from power plants.22 
The EPA has now established a three-part plan for reducing GHG 
emissions. This consists of improvements to mobile source standards, 
construction permitting and stationary sources. The mobile source standards 
(5% per year to 2025), involve moving the vehicle fleet average fuel efficiency to 
35.5 miles per gallon (mpg) in 2016 to 54.5 mpg in 2025. The construction 
permitting sees improvements to the energy efficiency of new buildings, to be 
implemented by the states. And finally, the introduction of performance 
standards for new and existing electricity generators. This covers around 32% of 
                                                        
 
21 The Waxman-Markey Bill (the proposed US Clean Energy and Security Act 2009) actually 
passed 219-212 in the House of Representatives, but failed to progress in the Senate. 
22 The Settlement is available at: 
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2010/12/23/document_gw_02.pdf 
(accessed 03 December 2015). 
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current emissions. The first two approaches were set out in 2011, and the third, 
known as the EPA Clean Power Plan, was set out in 2014. 
The EPA’s approach involves setting out conditions where a carbon 
market might emerge as the cheapest way to meet the emission standards it has 
set (Environmental Protection Agency, 2014 and 2015). To that end, the EPA has 
proceeded as follows: it has taken a number of technology building blocks to 
arrive at a Best System of Emission Reduction (BSER) standard for each state out 
to 2030. These technology building blocks suggest actions that each US state 
could take with respect to its existing fossil fuel plant fleet. The final BSER 
standards are arrived at by combining: an improvement in the heat rate of coal 
fired power plants; an increase in the utilisation of national gas power plants; 
and increased use of zero carbon renewables. The Final Rule published in 
October 2015 shows projected power plant emissions reductions of 32% by 
2030, relative to 2005 (Environmental Protection Agency, 2015, p. 64924). 
At the state level, the BSER translates into proposed state level goals for 
adjusted MWh-weighted-average pounds of CO2 per Net MWh covering all 
Affected Fossil Fuel-Fired units. Because the existing mix of fossil fuel power 
plants is different the state level goals vary by state (see some examples in Table 
3). 
 
Table 3: Final State Goals 
(lbs CO2 per MWh - rate-based standard) 
 
  
 
  
State 
Interim 
Goal 
Final 
Goal 
(2022-29) 2030 
Montana 1534 1305 
Kentucky 1509 1286 
Illinois 1456 1245 
Ohio 1383 1190 
Pennsylvania 1258 1095 
Texas 1188 1042 
New York 1025 918 
California 907 828 
Idaho 832 771 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency (2015, p. 64824). 
 
Under the policy each state is to submit a plan for compliance. State level plans 
must be presented to the EPA by 2016 (with the possibility of a two-year 
extension) with the compliance period due to begin in 2022. The states are free 
to pursue multiple pathways to compliance using a CO2 per unit of MWh (rate-
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based) or a total emissions (mass-based) standard. They could comply, for 
instance, through emissions trading with other states. Thus states could 
participate in multi-state plan in order to achieve their emissions reduction 
goals. 
A key feature of the EPA’s impact assessment of their clean power plan is 
that there is substantial net present value in the social cost benefit assessment of 
their plan. Most interestingly half (or more) of the benefits arise from associated 
reductions in other types of pollutants (produced with the CO2) that directly 
impact on local and regional health within the United States. Total compliance 
costs are estimated to $5-9 billion p.a. Table 4 shows the detail for rate-based 
scheme. Mass-based schemes are estimated to have lower compliance costs ($3 
billion p.a. less in 2030) and lower air pollution health co-benefits, but similar 
net benefits. This is partly because mass-based schemes can benefit from 
(cheaper) demand reduction measures. Existing state carbon trading regimes are 
consistent with a mass-based approach. 
 
Table 4: Summary of Estimated Monetized Benefits, Compliance Costs and 
Net Benefits for the Proposed Guidelines in 2030 (billions of 2011$) 
 Rate-Based Plan 
3% discount rate 
 
Climate Benefits 
 
20 
Air pollution health  
co-benefits 
14-34 
Total compliance costs 8.4 
 
Net Benefits  
(with climate benefits at 
3% discount rate) 
 
26-45 
Source: Environmental Protection Agency (2015, p. 64680). 
 
The EPA’s plan is still subject to potential legal challenge, modification and delay 
(Carson and Kreilis, 2015), but it looks increasingly likely that it will give a 
significant boost to the prospects for a national carbon market to emerge in the 
US by 2022. 
 
4.2    Chinese Progress With Carbon Trading 
 
China is now the world’s biggest emitter of GHGs (22.4% in 2012) and has been 
making significant progress with its carbon policy.23 
                                                        
 
23 Indeed the US and China have made a joint Presidential announcement about their carbon 
trading plans. See https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china-joint-
presidential-statement-climate-change 
(accessed 03 December 2015). 
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The National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC)24 has stated 
that China’s climate change-related goals for 2020 include the following: 
reducing CO2 per unit of GDP by 40-45% relative to 2005, and increasing the 
ratio of non-fossil energy to the consumption of primary energy to 15%. Its 
current Five Year Plan (12th FYP 2011-2015) goals, to be completed at the end of 
2015, are: to reduce CO2 per unit of GDP by 17% relative to the end of the end of 
FYP 11, and to reduce national energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16% 
relative to the end of FYP 11. During the current 12th FYP, seven local pilot 
carbon trading schemes have been established, following approval from the 
NDRC in October 2011, and the intention is to move to a national carbon market 
by 2017. 
The characteristics of the 7 pilot schemes are indicated in Table 5. They 
all cover the electric power sector and other heavy industry. The pilot period is 
currently 2013-2015, with emissions capped at the same annual level for 
Shenzen, Shanghai, Beijing and Tianjin, and capped at levels requiring a decrease 
of 4.13% p.a. for Chongquing, and allowing moderate increases in Guangdong 
and Hubei (Xiong et al., 2015). The coverage of sectors varies from 4 sectors in 
Guangdong to 26 sectors in Shanghai (though all cover electric power) 
(ZhongXiang, 2015). 
 
Table 5: Key characteristics of the Chinese Emissions Trading Pilots 
 
 Shenzhen Shanghai Beijing Hubei Guangdong Tianjin Chongqing 
Start of 
operation 
2013 2013 2013 2014 2013 2013 2014 
Carbon 
intensity 
target 
2011-2015 
-21% -21% -18% -17% -19.5% -19% -17% 
Threshold >20000 
t CO2 
>20000 
t CO2 
>20000 
t CO2 
>60000 
t CO2 
>20000 
t CO2 
>20000 
t CO2 
>20000 
t CO2 
Initial Year 
Allowances 
33 Mt 160 Mt 50 Mt 324 Mt 388 Mt 160 Mt 125 Mt 
Entities 
covered 
635 191 490 138 242 114 184 
Emissions 
covered 
38% 50% 50% 35% 42% 60% 35-40% 
Offsets 10% 5% 5% 10% 10% 10% 8% 
Free initial 
allocation 
c.95% 100% c.95% c.90% c.97% 100% 100% 
Penalties  3X 
market 
price 
10-100k 
CNY 
3-5X 
market 
price 
3X 
market 
price 
3X market 
price 
NA 2X market 
price 
Source: World Bank (2014, p. 122); Xiong et al. (2015, p. 2511, 2513); ZhongXiang 
(2015). 
 
                                                        
 
24 The NDRC is a cabinet level department responsible for state economic development planning 
and for guiding the restructuring of the Chinese economy. 
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Table 5 indicates that these are large pilots, though the number of covered 
entities is small. ZhongXiang (2015) reports that there has been a high level of 
compliance with the scheme in the first year and that there have been some 
emissions reductions, though the pattern of trading in the markets indicates that 
covered entities are waiting to the end of the compliance window to buy permits 
rather than trying to minimise the cost throughout the trading period. However, 
the experience to date shows that the idea of carbon pricing can work in China. 
The NDRC is currently preparing for a national carbon market 
(ZhongXiang, 2015) to include electric power, metallurgy, non-ferrous metals, 
building materials, chemicals and aviation. The threshold for inclusion will be 
26000 tonnes of CO2 per year. To prepare for this, all entities emitting 13000 
tonnes of CO2 or consuming more than 5000 tonnes of coal in 2010 have been 
required to submit their carbon emissions since 2014. The Chinese carbon 
market might therefore consist of 10000 covered entities, emitting between 3-
4000 m tonnes of CO2, making it the largest in the world. 
 
5.    Conclusions 
 
The idea of using the market to deliver carbon reductions is a potent one relative 
to the alternatives (notably regulatory controls through technology and 
performance standards, or incentives for low carbon technologies through 
subsidies and price supports). Carbon emissions permit trading is a globally 
popular form of carbon pricing. A global carbon market is highly desirable as a 
low cost way of delivering emissions reduction: indeed a reasonably 
comprehensive carbon market should be the economic centre-piece of any 
quantity based target for global GHG emissions, especially in the early stages 
towards deep cuts in global emissions. 
We are still a long way from trading carbon in significant volumes across 
borders, but once again, there are encouraging signs that this is happening. The 
EU ETS has achieved transboundary trading of carbon in a wide geographic area. 
This scheme is capable of being linked globally and has helped create a 
significant market for CDM CERs from developing countries. Carbon does thus 
have an opportunity cost in many countries as a result of the EU ETS.  
Australia provides a cautionary tale on the steady progress of carbon 
pricing mechanisms. Clearly, distributional issues need to be addressed within 
countries, as do the substantial leakage issues associated with the potential 
impact on traded sectors. However, there are encouraging signs in both the US 
and China on the potential future direction of carbon markets within those 
countries. In the US case (but also in China), the association of carbon abatement 
with local and regional clean air impacts is a powerful and potentially potent 
way of widening the political support and resolve for domestic action on GHGs 
by making the national cost benefit case for action. 
Is it possible that the creation of a global market can be consistent with 
the principles of a ‘good’ energy policy (see Pollitt, 2015)? A ‘good’ energy policy 
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should address the multidisciplinary issues around: the perception of the policy; 
the appropriate use of quantification in its justification; its impact on human 
well-being; its ability to garner public trust; the appropriate roles for state and 
non-state actors; whether it is capable of being delivered competently; and 
whether it exhibits consistency with other policy areas such as healthcare. I 
would argue that a market for carbon arising from quantitative national GHG 
quantity reduction allocations actually is capable of being a ‘good’ policy when 
looked at in the light of these issues.  
Perception issues can be addressed and quantitative justification can be 
convincing as the progress with introducing national and regional carbon 
markets demonstrates. The recent association, by the EPA in the US, of GHG 
reductions with ‘clean’ air is a good example of an attempt to address negative 
perception issues around ‘climate change’ and ‘global environmental problems’, 
while being specific and salient in the area of the link to human well-being and 
making a direct link with healthcare. Experiments demonstrate that public trust 
in the operation of carbon markets can be fostered, and that carbon markets do 
much to set an appropriate role for the state in setting a framework within which 
both the private sector and other non-state actors can make meaningful and 
verifiable contributions to cutting emissions. Markets for carbon can be delivered 
competently in many jurisdictions, especially where there a possibility exists for 
small jurisdictions to join a larger regional trading area. 
There is still a long way to go before we see emergence of anything like a 
comprehensive system for pricing of carbon externalities. There is still 
considerable doubt as to whether the piecemeal actions of individual 
governments with respect to emissions will ever add up to the necessary amount 
of emissions reductions that climate science claims to be necessary.25 While 
establishing the amount of emissions required and dividing it up acceptably 
between countries requires an enormous scientific and international 
negotiations effort, the economic instruments to deliver the agreed targets are 
readily at hand.  
 
 
 
  
                                                        
 
25 The current public commitments (as of October 2015) of governments to reduce GHGs by 
2030 fall well short of what the IPCC (2014) are calling for, see Boyd et al. (2015). 
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